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“Stop for a second in a rushing crowd. There is the Other next to you. Meeting Him is the greatest experience of
all. Talking to the Other, feeling him out while at the same time knowing that he sees and understands the world
differently, is crucial to building the atmosphere for positive dialogue”
R. Kapuścinski, Ten Inny, (The Other), Warszawa, 2010 (my translation)
From resentment to the politics of resentment. A manual
Resentment sweeps across Europe. Yet, the concept itself, its consequences and modus operandi, are far from
clear. We continue to lack a solid conceptual framework to deal with it. We only scratch the surface by adopting
intuitive understanding of the term and equate it with the politics of protest, contestation and revolt against
mainstream politics. Yet contestation and conflict itself are a part and parcel of a democratic process and open
public sphere in why different world views compete for popular attention. In this traditional sense resentment is
often analysed together with the populism and the two are even used interchangeably. Just like populism
resentment is not only anti-elitist, but also anti-pluralist, two features rightly identified by J. W. Müller in his
insightful analysis as constitutive for populism. Populism appeals to resentment by excluding others from „the
people”, rising suspicion and uncertainty, thriving on conspiracy theories.
Resentment never works on its own, though. It is always a function, and mixture of, culture, history and domestic
politics. As a result of this „bifurcation” resentment works differently in different environments and manifests itself
in different guises: Brexit in UK, more generally anti-European sentiments across the continent, rise of the right-
wing parties in Germany, Austria and France, the spread of hate speech and exclusion of the „the Other”, and,
last but not least, more recently disabling constitutional checks and balances and taking over the state with
looming POLEXIT in Poland. The rationale behind resentment – distrust – plays out in each and every case just
mentioned, yet it operates differently, with varying intensity, consequences and methods. Resentment transforms
our traditional understanding of conflict. While democratic politicians compete with their own visions for society
and politics and to this end make representative claims, they always stick to the language of “probability” for
describing their alternatives to the status quo. They are ready to present these to the constitutional vetting
through procedures and elections, and most importantly, they will be ready to accept failure and come back …
with better alternatives. The constitution provides the political stage and frames this never-ending contestation
and vying for political recognition. This is what makes democracy vibrant and dynamic. On the other hand,
resentment-driven politicians see their claims as settling most fundamental issues once and for all and not
allowing any room for critique and contestation. Their claims can not be judged along the lines of „truth” and
„falsehood” because of their moral dimension. Their claims are always the best and not open for further
contestation.
So far so good. I would argue, however, that transitioning from „ resentment” as an emotion of rejection and
critique of the unsatisfactory liberal status quo to the more formalised and institutionalised „politics of resentment”
is crucial in our understanding of the ascent of illiberal narratives in Europe. It gives us a chance of harnessing
resentment in more conceptual terms and schemes. Resentment alone is an emotion in need of constitutional
doctrine, and “politics of resentment” add a crucial dimension to populism: a constitutional doctrine that
competes with the dominant liberal constitutionalism (for important clarification see also here) and delivers on the
promise of populist narratives. The doctrine of „politics of resentment” ranges from relentless abuse of
constitutional arrangements to flat-out rejection of a constitutional document. Critique (the constitution seen as a
vestige of the old regime) is a unifying factor for both approaches; what distinguishes one from the other is how
deep and far the constitutional humiliation goes. In the former case, given the lack of constitutional majority, the
constitution is dispensed with per fas et nefas by disregarding its clear provisions or adopting regulations that fly
in the face of a constitution. With constitutional review in tatters, such unconstitutional practice becomes
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business us usual. In the latter case,  the politics of resentment resort to the ultimate weapon and adopt a new
constitution that reflects and entrenches new narrative. One of the tenets of the new doctrine of “the politics of
resentment” is outright rejection of the liberal rule of law. It distorts the communication processes between the
representatives of the people and the people themselves. It is an unwanted technicality that, at best protects the
disgusting elites while oppressing the real people. As such it must be remodelled and harnessed so as to enable
and protect the decision making that at long last would reflect the purified rule of the people.
What truly differentiates the „politics of resentment” from mere contestation and dissatisfaction with the status
quo is its resort to the “constitutional capture” as a tool to remodel the state and unseat the hitherto dominant
(and allegedly failing) liberal narrative. Constitutional capture is a generic and novel concept (interestingly,
American scholars are waking up now to their own version of constitutional capture, or retrogression, as they call
it). It stands for a systemic weakening of checks and balances and entrenching power by making future changes
in power difficult.
Constitutional capture has in-built spill-over effect and as such the potential of Europe-wide adverse
consequences. It travels in time and space. The „Turkish – Hungarian – Polish” connection is a case in point and
shows how new authoritarians learn from each other. As there is simply no place for a veto emanating from any
institution other than the majoritarian parliaments, the „politics of resentment” target institutions that otherwise
might be seen as a brake on the power of the people’s representatives. Institutions are only accepted as long as
they are our institutions and translate the only right message that deserves to be out in the public sphere. Such
understanding leads to an important tweak to the established narrative: institutions that have been channeling
(for populists “distorting”) the rule of law must be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. With the extreme
majoritarianism as one of the courier stones of the new doctrine, disabling constitutional courts and judicial
review is first order of the day for constitutional capture.
As a result, and with the benefit of hindsight, the Polish Constitutional Court never had a chance and its
destruction was first on the to-do list of the Polish authoritarians. The very survival of the politics of resentment
was on the line here and the independent court was its most deadly enemy. The logging case now pending at
the Court of Justice, and the repeated denouncement by Polish ruling party of any decision the Court will take in
the case, proves this anti-institutional trajectory and some more. Poland’s paranoid reaction to the Court’s
alleged meddling in our own affairs adds a new crucial dimension to the “exit in values” (we are past this stage
now) – “exit in legality” (I am grateful to Kim Lane Scheppele for this distinction). All institutions, domestic,
supranational, stand in the way and are not part of the new populist constitutionalism. This is no longer gentle
constitutional tinkering. This is all-out constitutional reconquest.
Politics of resentment and belonging
My argument is that at its deepest “politics of resentment” call into doubt the very commitments entered
voluntarily. „Politics of resentment" strikes at the very core of the societal fabric. “Politics of resentment” speaks
on behalf of the people, and at the same time it itself defines the people. My argument is that resentment-driven
politics is much more dangerous for the EU than the Euro crisis. As serious and grave as the financial crisis is, it
is after all a result of political miscalculations and omissions, and the challenges now are about leadership and
policy reorientation. With the politics of resentment, though, the situation is diametrically different. The
challenges coming in the wake of the „politics of resentment” are more fundamental and existential in nature as
the very backbone of the EU (rule of law and democracy) is at stake. For one, the „politics of resentment”
endanger the very basis of mutual trust that has been defining the European project ever since its inception. The
trust has been always built on the convergence between the fundamental values of Member States and their
legal orders on the one hand, and the foundations of the Union legal order on the other hand. In the latter case,
the EU must be seen as a whole that is, as a collectivity beyond the set of states that is more than the sum of its
parts. Indeed, as one of the founding fathers of European Treaties, P. Pescatore, has emphasised in his classic
The Law of Integration. Emergence of a new phenomenon in international relations based on the experience of
the European Communities, (Leiden, 1974), supranationality has been predicated on the idea of „ an order
determined by the existence of common values and interests”.
Seen from this perspective, constitutional capture in Poland, both at the level of values and legality, is much
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more than just an isolated example of yet another government going rogue. There is an important European
dimension to what has transpired in Poland over the last 24 months. Past European crises galvanised European
states toward further EU integration. Yet, past crises never questioned the overlapping European consensus that
coalesced around a broadly shared political vision of Europe. Resentment-driven constitutional capture in
Poland undermines the very idea of Europe, and the principles of liberalism, tolerance, “living together” and
“never again”. It replaces these founding principles with zero-sum politics, „ us vs. them” and a competing
constitutional narrative of fundamental disagreement over values. It proclaims that “We, the European peoples”
are not ready to live together in one pluralistic constitutional regime. It becomes clear that “the politics of
resentment” backed up by capture not only challenges the standard origin story of the EU – that it was founded
to bring peace and prosperity to Europe by ending the possibility of war and encouraging the common rebuilding
of economies – but puts forward a new competing constitutional project and design. The „overlapping
consensus” recognises that the European polity is composed of distinct peoples and respects other peoples’ lives
and ways. Yet, for the consensus to work at the same time, „We the European peoples” should acknowledge
certain fundamentals that bind and discipline us and brought us together. As argued by J. H. H. Weiler: “it is a
remarkable instance of constitutional tolerance to accept to be bound by a decision not by ‚my people’ but by a
majority among peoples which are precisely not mine – a people, if you wish, of ‚others’. I compromise my self
determination in this fashion as an expression of this kind of internal – towards myself and external – towards
others – tolerance”.
It is here that the “politics of resentment” deals a deadly blow to the whole of European project. Resentment-
driven constitutional capture challenges European solidarity and mutual trust in a fundamental way. It proposes
to reverse "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" and signals a dark turn inward. By showing that
liberalism and democracy no longer animate national constitutions and politics, and by revealing that illiberal
states can now flourish within the EU, the Polish experience poses an existential challenge to the EU. Can the
EU mount a response to the challenge? Is EU still able to foster respect for commitments of principle that brought
member states together? Does it have a safety valve by which it can deflate excessive nationalism and
manifestly illiberal practices? Can it preserve the common values that launched the European project –
supranationalism? More particularly, can domestic constitution-making be constrained from the outside? So far
these questions received deflating negative replies as the EU has been reduced to an idle by-stander, extending 
deadlines and assurances of a dialogue, all this while Polish authoritarians laugh at EU’s face and the capture
marched on. EU leadership might even be unaware that as of today it already lost Poland …
The Politics of resentment: From captured state to captive mind
If there is one thing the authoritarians are afraid of, it is free thinking and an empowered citizenry. That explains
why the “politics of resentment” must not stop at the institutions. It takes over the public discourse, creates new
heroes and plots worthy of putting on the pedestal of history. It is instructive (again for all the wrong reasons)
how politics of resentment translated into the politics of memory has been rewriting history in Poland and how it
affected the way Poles remember the past. The „politics of resentment” resorts to what I call memory capture
that calls into question “We, the Polish people”. “Memory capture” is based on a systemic weakening of the
inclusive approach to the past, which allows all voices to be heard. It offers a more flattened and one-
dimensional explanation of where “We, the Poles” came from and what makes up our national identity.
“Memory capture” is vindictive: Poland and the Poles have suffered so much in the past that they are now
entitled to a greater respect and recognition for their sufferings. Poland has rightful expectations to be a taker, not
a giver, because we have already given too much and should now be compensated for all our sacrifices and
sufferings. Crucially for my analysis, memory capture consists of enslaving the past within one dominant narrative
and, as a result, entails an imbalance in our collective remembering and way of looking at the past. Certain
elements are exposed and celebrated, while others that do not fit the overarching rationale and narrative are
relegated to the margins of public discourse, castigated, and even, as will be shown below, penalised. In the end,
the historical debate is tainted by an imbalance and asymmetry.
This is where the concept of mis-memory enters the picture, distorting our reading of our national history and the
past. The high rhetoric adopted is always the same: to protect the good name of Poland. Beneath the surface,
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though, lurk the true motives of Polish political masters: negation of historical truth by silencing those who dare to
speak honestly, without sugar-coating, about past events. “Memory capture” and “mis-memory” dictate a vision
of the past that is one-dimensional: we suffered, and others always plotted against us. Today the day of
reckoning has come and Poland must be put back on the pedestal as a victimised sufferer. Anyone who counters
our understanding of our past is characterised almost instantaneously as a liar and a traitor.
Dealing with the politics of resentment resentment: A challenge of new opening
Moving forward is predicated on our ability to reposition ourselves vis-a-vis the sacrosanct narrative of „an ever
closing union among the peoples of Europe” and abandon the comforting conviction of taken-for-grantedness
and that somehow Europe will find a way in the end. The challenge is to build a conceptual framework for
dealing with „politics of resentment”. My argument is that such conceptual framework should be centered around
basic challenges which would be presented here as a mixture of the past, present and the future. It calls on the
revisiting forgotten founding narratives of European integration (dimension of the past), rethinking Europe’s
vocation today (dimension of the present) and finally, opening up for, and embracing, new vistas (dimension of
the future and language we use when talking today of the European Union). I propose to group the challenges in
the following way: the challenge of „We, the peoples”; the challenge of inclusion; the challenge of constitutional
culture and fidelity („bottom-up” constitutionalism); the challenge of dialogue/public discourse; the challenge of
pluralism/tolerance; the challenge of building constitutional fidelity; the challenge of rethinking the „membership in
crisis” and, interrelated to that, the challenge of credible commitments backed up by viable enforcement
mechanisms, and finally the challenge of belonging and embracing „the Other” as part of European pluralist
constitutionalism.
„Politics of resentment” strike at the very basis of social fabric: trust. They alienate, exclude, destroy the old world
and narratives without offering new alternatives except exclusion and distrust. Crucially, in the end they capture
the state, the institutions, constitutional and historic narratives, seal off the space for free exchange of ideas and
world views. As we try to move forward, the question is this: Are we ready to continue living together in a
constitutional regime, internally divergent, yet always able to respond to the exigencies and demands of new
realities? The challenge behind this question has been eloquently summarised by J. Tully’s „canoe metaphor”:
„Perhaps the great constitutional struggles and failures around the world today are groping towards the third way
of constitutional change, symbolised by the ability of the members of the canoe to discuss and reform their
constitutional arrangements in response to the demands for recognition as they paddle. A constitution can be
both the foundation of democracy and, at the same time, subject to democratic discussion and change in
practice”. With the „politics of resentment” at the heart of European disintegration, with the deafening passivity,
lack of political leadership and constitutional imagination of the European elites, and with the „constitutional
capture” being elevated now to the status of new constitutional doctrine, the challenge of „Doing Europe”, of
overlapping consensus and tolerance for “the Other” has never been more acute … and dramatic. The
comfortable „it won’t happen to us ” is no longer an option. Will the EU finally tune in and listen?
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